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Abstract Employer-provided insurance is the leading source of medical insur-
ance for non-elderly Americans. However, it leaves many without coverage.
Evidence suggests that the non-group insurance market does a poor job of
filling in these gaps, for those with both short- and long-term uninsurance. It
does so for all income and age groups, as well as for both genders. It does fill
some of the gaps in employer-provided coverage for those with middle and
high incomes, though very incompletely.
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Introduction
Employers are the leading providers of insurance for non-elderly Americans.
Thanks to preferential tax treatment, the medical insurance-as-compensation
paradigm ties medical insurance to employment status. The irregular nature
of employment drives the potential for spells of uninsurance that coincide with
spells of unemployment. While laws such as COBRA expand the availability of
employer-provided insurance beyond the last date of employment, they do so
at a high cost to the (former) worker. It has also been noted that the employer
provision of insurance may lead workers to stay on the job too long. Madrian
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(1994) finds evidence that sick workers stay on jobs inefficiently for access to
group insurance provided by the job.
Either inefficient outcome (not enough insurance, too much employment)
depends upon the irregular nature of the labor market, and the possibility of
(suitably substitutable) medical insurance outside of it. Standard assumptions
about risk aversion yield a strong result—agents should demand full insurance
if a competitive market with full information is able to provide it at an
actuarially fair price. Deviations from fully symmetric information may lead
to adverse selection and market failure, such as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and Akerlof (1970). Thus, non-group insurance markets, without the
restrictions of the employer-provided market, should be able to provide insur-
ance for the gaps left by employer-provided insurance, and perhaps even do a
better job.
In order to assess the adequacy of non-employer medical insurance as
a replacement for employer-provided insurance, the patterns of irregular
employer-provided insurance are connected to periods of other medical insur-
ance. Detailed insurance data is available in the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS), which reports insurance status on a month-by-month basis,
by source. While non-group insurance does fill in some of the gaps left by
employer-provided insurance, it does a very incomplete job. Breaking down
these gaps by demographics, health and income shows that the non-group
market is failing to fill in the gaps for all groups.
These finding are consistent with earlier research. The irregular nature
of insurance, and the difficulty of measuring this in typical survey data has
been discussed in Lewis et al. (1998). The difference between point-in-time
measurements, and the “have you had insurance at all recently” questions
asked by typical surveys, has been investigated by Swartz (1994). More recent
studies of Olson et al. (2005) and Short and Graefe (2003) follow up that work.
That literature reports the differences between the point-in-time realities faced
by households, and the answers households provide when asked more general
survey questions. In this study, these patterns are broken down by insurance
sources, and according to relevant health, demographic and income variables
to understand the capacity for non-group insurance to temporarily fill in for
employer-provided insurance.
These gaps have consequences for health care access and health care utiliza-
tion. Leininger (2009) found that gaps in coverage have significant effects for
total utilization. Thus, individuals cannot just intertemporally substitute their
way out of a gap in insurance coverage—the gaps left unfilled by employer
provided insurance matter. Thus, it is important to understand for whom non-
group insurance fails (or succeeds) to fill these gaps.
Irregular Insurance is Employer-(not) Provided
The sources and spans of insurance are found in the 2006 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS collects data on health care utilization and
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its sources, insurance and its source, labor market outcomes, and demographics
for a nationally-representative sample of the US. Respondents provide data
five times over a two year panel. The data include precise information regard-
ing the timing and source of insurance, through its monthly insurance status
variables. For each month of 2006, it is determined whether an individual
has any medical insurance; whether that insurance is public or private; and if
private, whether it is employer-provided, other group, or non-group. Because
they represent the predominant sources of private insurance,the first and the
last types of insurance are the subjects of interest. From this information,
the number of months insured by a source of insurance are constructed.
If an individual has insurance from a source the entire year, the person is
continuously insured; if there is some coverage, but not for the entire year,
the person is irregularly insured. The rest are not insured by a source.
Table 1 presents the sample means of standard socio-economic and de-
mographic variables for the data. Four main variables are of interest are
reported—age, gender, self-reported health status and family income as a
fraction of the poverty level. Self-reported health status is asked of the family’s
respondent at the time of the second interview in a calendar year (the second
interview in the first year, or the fourth in the second year). Responses of
“excellent,” “very good,” or “good,” are recoded as “good”, while responses of
“fair”or “poor” are recoded as “not good.” Nearly 91% of the sample reported
being in “good health.”
Family income information is collected throughout the MEPS sampling
periods, and used to construct the family’s income as a fraction of the federal
poverty line. Households with income less than 200% of the poverty line
(roughly $40,000 for a family of four) were classified as “low income or below,”
while the rest were “middle income or above.” Nearly 70% of the households
were recorded as earning middle income or greater.
Table 2 presents the fraction of the population that reported each number
of months of insurance, from a source. These fractions are from the the
non-elderly, non-Veteran sub-population. First note that the fraction of the
subpopulation with irregular insurance is large, just 2% smaller than those
without insurance the entire year. This is made up primarily of persons with
more rather than less insurance—while the irregularly insured are distributed
smoothly across one to eleven months, it is more likely that they have one
to four months of gaps, compared to eight to eleven months. These measures
highlight the advantages of the MEPS, and why it is needed to understand how
well non-group insurance fills in the gaps of employer-provided insurance.
Table 1 Sample means for
the 2006 MEPS, non-elderly
and non-Veteran, using
sample weights





Inc. > 2xF PL 0.698
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Table 2 Number of months
insured, non-elderly and
non-Veteran populations
N = 27, 498
Months Any Private Employer-provided Non-group
0 0.142 0.306 0.361 0.972
1 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001
2 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.001
3 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.001
4 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.001
5 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.001
6 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.002
7 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.001
8 0.015 0.009 0.009 0.001
9 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.001
10 0.016 0.012 0.011 0.001
11 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.001
12 0.736 0.605 0.552 0.018
These gaps overall can be tied directly to gaps in the private insurance
market. And gaps in the private insurance market are due to gaps in employer-
provided insurance. The third column of Table 2 presents the fraction of the
population with employer-provided insurance for some number of months,
while the fourth presents the same for non-group insurance. The non-group
insurance market is much smaller than the employer-provided market. The
fraction with some non-group insurance is large relative to those with an entire
year’s worth of non-group insurance, vis-a-vis employer-provided insurance, if
only because the former market is so small. This, in turn, mitigates its capacity
to fill in the gaps left by employer-provided insurance.
Reading these gaps is a delicate craft. While it currently appears that the
non-group market is not filling the gaps left by the employer-provided market,
it just states that the reverse of Say’s Law (i.e., demand creates its own supply)
does not hold locally.1 This does not speak to the welfare consequences
if the tax incentives for employer-provided insurance were removed, and
the employer-provided market were replaced by the non-group market. The
local market failure on display here may be reproduced en masse in such
a counterfactual policy experiment, or it may not. These summary statistics
suggest private non-group insurance markets do an incomplete job of filling in
the gaps that currently exist.
One final point about these gaps—they may be due to unemployment,
employers not offering insurance, or workers not enrolling in insurance plans.
Sommers and Crimmel (2008) use related information in the 2006 MEPS,
and find that 87% of US private-sector workers have employers that offer
insurance, and that only 61% of them ultimately enroll. In either case, workers
(and their dependents) have legitimate demand for medical insurance, and
may remain uninsured.
1If there are competitive insurance markets with no or small loading costs, risk aversion guarantees
that all agents will demand (and be supplied with) full insurance at an actuarially fair price.
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Breaking Down the Gaps
One concern about non-group insurance’s ability to substitute for employer-
provided insurance is its affordability. This question has previously been
addressed by Bundorf and Pauly (2006), which also looked at the MEPS,
though using a broader measure of insurance. Following their lead, these
trends are broken down by poverty category, as reported by the MEPS. If the
relationship between gaps in employer-provided insurance and spans of non-
group insurance grow stronger as people grow wealthier, affordability may be
an issue.
Table 3 presents the fractions of the population with insurance by length
of coverage, broken down by insurance type, and split between those with
middle income or above, or below. Unsurprisingly, lower-income families have
members who are much less likely to have insurance. This is in part because
lower-income families may not have access to employer-provided insurance,
because of unemployment, or employers won’t offer it to lower-wage workers.
The public medical insurance safety net provided by Medicaid and SCHIP
mitigates the lack of insurance. However, the non-group insurance market
does very little to fill in the gaps.
Why might this be the case? Typical assumptions about preferences, such
as constant relative risk aversion, induce higher demand for insurance among
lower income risk avoiders. Bundorf and Pauly (2006) finds that using the
classical sense of affordability (“Is it in the budget set?”), income constraints
are not an issue for many of these low-income families. If health care is
a normal good, and medical insurance contracts are not sensitive to these
differences, they may be selected out of the insurance market.
Another key feature of employer-provided insurance is that it does not
discriminate. Or, rather, it is not allowed to discriminate in price in ways that
an actuarially fairly priced insurance contracts would discriminate. Employers
are forbidden from varying employee contributions according to gender, age,
or health status. Yet actuarially fair non-group insurance contracts would,
depending upon state regulations. For example, Codispoti et al. (2008) docu-
mented the different prices women face for medical insurance in the non-group
market.
While women may face different prices, there is not much evidence that the
non-group market works any better or worse for women than it does for men.
Table 3 Number of months insured, non-elderly and non-Veteran populations, by poverty group
Months Family income < 200% of FPL (0.302) > 200% FPL
Any Private E-P N-G Any Private E-P N-G
0 0.239 0.659 0.712 0.978 0.100 0.154 0.209 0.969
1–11 0.186 0.097 0.089 0.009 0.094 0.085 0.087 0.011
12 0.575 0.245 0.199 0.014 0.806 0.761 0.705 0.020
N = 27, 498
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Table 4 Number of months insured, non-elderly and non-Veteran populations, by gender
Months Male (0.477) Female
Any Private E-P N-G Any Private E-P N-G
0 0.166 0.315 0.367 0.973 0.120 0.298 0.354 0.970
1–11 0.119 0.089 0.088 0.011 0.124 0.088 0.087 0.010
12 0.715 0.596 0.545 0.016 0.756 0.613 0.559 0.020
N = 27, 498
Table 4 breaks down the incidence of full, irregular and no insurance by source
and gender. Women are generally more likely to be insured, but this is not
due to increased incidence of non-group insurance (or in spite of a decreased
incidence of it). The fraction of women irregularly insured is the same as that
for men; the increased incidence of continuous insurance for women is drawn
from the decreased incidence of a continuous lack of insurance among women.
It can also be useful to break down insurance rates by self-reported health.
While this is a subjective measure of an individual’s health, it might provide
insight as to how the market fills in the gaps for those who are subject to a self-
perceived demand shifter of health insurance. These responses are recoded as
“good health” or “not good health” as described above, and the insurance rates
were broken by these health categories. The statistics are reported in Table 5.
The healthy are more likely to have insurance, especially employer-
provided insurance. Both groups have a similar incidence of irregular in-
surance, though neither group is often served by the non-group insurance
market. Of course, the causation here is not clear—the unhealthy could not
have insurance because they cannot work, or the limited access to care of the
uninsured drives the uninsured to be less healthy.
Age is another piece of information that private markets would use in a
non-group setting, but employers are restricted from using. The expansions of
public health insurance in the late 1990s and early 2000s make it essential to
consider two distinct groups—children under age 18, and adults 19 and older.
These expansions were focused on children (hence the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program), and primarily increased the family income eligibility
thresholds.
Table 6 presents the incidence of private insurance among children, accord-
ing to family income relative to 200% of the federal poverty line. Children from
Table 5 Number of months insured, non-elderly and non-Veteran populations, by self-reported
health status
Months Healthy (0.919) Unhealthy
Any Private E-P N-G Any Private E-P N-G
0 0.138 0.288 0.343 0.971 0.191 0.509 0.555 0.979
1–11 0.119 0.089 0.088 0.011 0.153 0.089 0.080 0.007
12 0.743 0.623 0.569 0.019 0.656 0.402 0.364 0.013
N = 27, 465
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Table 6 Number of months insured, children, by family income group
Months Family income > 200% FPL < 200% (0.385)
Any Private E-P N-G Any Private E-P N-G
0 0.053 0.162 0.224 0.975 0.077 0.721 0.759 0.986
1-11 0.089 0.073 0.069 0.010 0.174 0.067 0.063 0.006
12 0.858 0.765 0.708 0.015 0.749 0.212 0.179 0.009
N = 9, 879.
low-income (and below) families are more likely to lack continuous insurance,
and particularly more likely to be irreguarly insured. These differences are
due overwhelmingly to the lack of regular employer-provided insurance. This
private insurance may be “crowded out” by the public insurance available to
these children. In either case, non-group insurance does not fill in the gaps left
by either irregular employer-provided plans, or employer-provided and public
insurance plans.
Among the adults, consider two age groups—the young (19–55) and near
elderly (55–64). Insurance incidence rates broken down by these two age
groups are reported in Table 7. Both groups exhibit a large portion without
insurance, though the near-elderly are more likely to have employer-provided
insurance. The role of non-group insurance in either group is limited. It does
not provide more insurance to the younger group, in spite of the greater
incidence of uninsurance in that group. Nor does it provide much insurance to
the near-elderly, in spite of the fact that the elderly likely have larger certainty
equivalents (willingness to pay for insurance less expected cost), and would be
more willing to take on the loading costs of insurance.
A linear probability model of ever having non-group insurance is used to
control for the many ways in which these groups differ that might confound
the differential incidence according to gender, income, etc. The explanatory
variables include the demographic and health information used above—
gender, income level, age group and self-reported health status. Two indicator
variables are also used—whether the individual had one to 11 months of
employer-provided insurance during the period, or if they did not have any.
This provides a sense of how often non-group insurance fills in for gaps in
employer-provided insurance, allowing for a qualitative difference between
some, but incomplete employer-provided insurance in a year, and a complete
lack of employer-provided insurance during a year.
Table 7 Number of months insured, non-elderly and non-Veteran adult populations, by age group
Months Young (0.841) Near-elderly
Any Private E-P N-G Any Private E-P N-G
0 0.189 0.284 0.338 0.971 0.120 0.225 0.290 0.956
1-11 0.131 0.104 0.104 0.012 0.070 0.057 0.056 0.009
12 0.680 0.611 0.558 0.018 0.811 0.719 0.654 0.035
N = 17, 619.
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The equation of interest is:
NGInsi = β1 · NoEPi + β2 · SomeEPi + βX · X + i,
where X is a matrix of the categorical demographic and health variables,
and NoEPi and SomeEPi are the employer-provided insurance explanatory
variables. Since all of the explanatory variables are categorical variables (and
no constant term is added), the usual concerns about the linear probability
model (e.g., predicted values below zero or above one) do not apply. The linear
probability model with categorical explanatory variables creates a multivariate
cross tabulation, with the coefficients representing the cell differences across
the cross-tabulated characteristics.
Table 8 reports the coefficients for no employer-provided insurance and
irregular employer-provided insurance. It suggests that non-group insurance
does fill in for gaps in the employer-provided insurance market. The effects
are small, and the relative magnitudes are intuitive—those who do not have
any employer-provided insurance during the year are more likely to have some
non-group insurance. That said, the economic significance of these effects are
small—the gaps in employer-provided coverage are large, and in theory should
Table 8 Selected estimated coefficients from a linear probability model of having any non-group
insurance
(1) (2) (3)
NoEP 0.066∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.007
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008)























∗∗∗’ed coefficients are statistically different from zero at 99%.
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be filled by non-group insurance. However, as the previous tables indicated,
they are not.
Which gaps are filled? In order to assess this, these two measures of
irregular employer-provided insurance are interacted with the four covariates
of interest—age group, gender, income and self-reported health. Non-group
insurance fills the large gaps of employer-provided insurance for households
with middle and high incomes—those with the greatest ability to pay for non-
group insurance. However, there is no effect when there is some employer-
provided insurance during the year. The near-elderly and healthy are likely to
have non-group insurance, but, again, only those who lack employer-provided
insurance for the entire year. Other interactions are neither statistically nor
economically significant, suggesting that the failure of non-group insurance to
fill in the gaps is due more to income than other observable characteristics.
The effects of income and age may mix, as the two are correlated. Do they
reinforce one another? To test this, the near-elderly dummy is interacted with
the middle-income or higher dummy. As before, the near-elderly with more
income are not more likely to have non-group insurance if they are partially
insured through an employer plan. However, they are more likely to have
non-group insurance if they do not have employer-provided insurance. The
role of income is particularly important for the near elderly—note that the
coefficient for the low-income and below near elderly falls to near zero with
no statistical significance. They are not likely to have non-group insurance
if they lack employer-provided insurance. However, the middle-income and
higher near-elderly do get insurance, at twice the rate of the young in the same
income group.
Conclusion
Employer-provided medical insurance is the primary source of medical insur-
ance for non-elderly Americans. Irregular employment can lead to irregular
medical insurance, if non-group insurance does not fill in the gaps. There is
evidence that while non-group insurance does fill in some of the gaps left by
employer-provided insurance, it still leaves many gaping holes in coverage.
While incidence of non-group insurance does vary by income, age, health
status and gender (by varying degrees), it by no means fills in the gaps
completely.
These results should be troubling to both economic theorists and those who
prescribe policy. Economic theory suggests that insurance markets will work
best when information is used freely and symmetrically, and without the many
restrictions on insurance provided at the workplace. The failure of non-group
insurance to fill in the gaps left by employer-provided insurance suggests that
just because a market should work does not mean that it will.
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